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Abstract. The current consideration of technology as ‘applied science’, this is to say, as
something that comes ‘after’ science, justiﬁes the lack of attention paid to technology in
science education. In our paper we question this simplistic view of the science-technology
relationship, historically rooted in the unequal appreciation of intellectual and manual work,
and we try to show how the absence of the technological dimension in science education
contributes to a na€ve and distorted view of science which deeply aﬀects the necessary scientiﬁc
and technological literacy of all citizens.
1. Introduction
When we ask science teachers ‘what technology is’, almost one hundred per
cent of the answers make reference to ‘applied science’. This common view
justiﬁes the lack of attention to technology in science education. In fact, the
most frequent references to technology included in science textbooks are
simple enumerations of applications of scientiﬁc knowledge (Solbes & Vilches
1997). On the other hand, most studies about the nature of science do not pay
any attention to the science-technology relationship (Ferna´ndez et al. 2002).
An analysis of the proceedings of the six precedent History, Philosophy and
Science Teaching International Conferences shows very clearly this lack of
attention, which is coherent with the view of technology as something which
comes after science.
In this paper we intend to show that this simplistic conception of the
science-technology relationship reinforces distorted views of science, consid-
ered by many authors as one of the main obstacles to renovation in science
education (Bell & Pearson 1992; Gil 1993; Guilbert & Meloche 1993; Hodson
1993; Meichtry 1993; De´sautels & Larochelle 1998a, b; McComas 1998). We
shall begin by questioning the idea of technology as applied science.
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2. Technology as ‘Applied Science’?
It is very easy to question this simplistic view of the science-technology
relationship: we just have to brieﬂy reﬂect on its historical development to
understand that technical activity has preceded the mere existence of science
by thousands of years (Gardner 1994). This obliges us to disregard the notion
of technology as a by-product of science (Maiztegui et al. 2002).
But the most important thing to clarify is what citizens’ scientiﬁc educa-
tion may lose because of this under-valuation of technology. This leads us to
ask, as Cajas (1999) does, if there is something in technology useful for
citizens’ scientiﬁc literacy that we science teachers are not taking into con-
sideration. Several authors have pointed out, in connection with this, some
characteristics of technology which, if ignored, impoverish science education
(Gardner 1994; Cajas 1999; Maiztegui et al. 2002). We shall study here a
particularly important consequence of the oblivion of the role of technology
in the construction of scientiﬁc knowledge: the reinforcement of serious
distortions of the nature of science.
3. A Decontextualised, Socially Neutral View of Science
We shall start with a misconception criticised by abundant literature (Fern-
a´ndez et al. 2002): the transmission of a socially neutral view of science which
ignores, or treats very superﬁcially, the complex relationship between Sci-
ence, Technology and Society, STS or, better yet, STSE, adding the E for
Environment to direct attention towards the serious problems of environ-
mental degradation which aﬀect the whole planet.
This superﬁcial analysis implies, as we have already seen, the consider-
ation of technology as a mere application of scientiﬁc knowledge, so exalting
science, more or less explicitly, as an absolute factor of progress.
In contrast to this na€ve view of science, there is a growing tendency to
blame science and technology for the environmental degradation in process on
our planet, with the destruction of the ozone layer, acid rain, etc. In our
opinion this is also a serious misconception: it is true that scientists and
technologists have a clear responsibility for, for instance, the production of
substances which are destroying the ozone layer … but along with busi-
nessmen, economists, workers or politicians. Criticism and calls to respon-
sibility should be extended to all of us, including the ‘simple consumers’ of
dangerous products. Besides, we cannot ignore that many scientists study the
problems humanity has to face nowadays, draw attention to the risks and
look for solutions (Giddens 1999).
These simplistic attitudes of absolute exaltation or rejection of science are
not founded at all and must be criticised. Nevertheless, the most serious
problem in science education comes from purely operative approaches which
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completely ignore the social context (Stinner 1995), as if science were an
activity carried out in ivory towers, at the margin of life’s contingencies, by
solitary geniuses who manage an abstract language of diﬃcult access. This
constitutes a second distortion of scientiﬁc activity that we must contemplate.
4. Science as an Individualistic and Elitist Activity
This individualistic and elitist conception is one of the distortions most fre-
quently signalled in literature (Ferna´ndez et al. 2002), together with the
closely related socially neutral view we have just studied. Scientiﬁc knowledge
appears as the work of isolated ‘great scientists’, ignoring the role of co-
operative work and of exchanges between diﬀerent research teams. Parti-
cularly, it is implicitly suggested that results obtained by only one scientist or
team may be enough to verify or falsify a hypothesis or even a theory.
In the same sense, science is quite frequently presented as a domain only
accessible to especially gifted minorities, therefore conveying negative
expectations to the majority of students, resulting in ethnic, social and sexual
discrimination: science is presented as an eminently ‘masculine’ activity.
No special eﬀort is made to make science meaningful and accessible; on
the contrary, the meaning of scientiﬁc knowledge is hidden behind mathe-
matical expressions, without previous qualitative approaches. Nor is the
human nature of scientiﬁc activity shown: an activity where errors and
confusion are inevitably part of the process … as happens with pupils’
learning.
We sometimes ﬁnd a contrary distortion which presents scientiﬁc activity
as something pertaining to common sense, thereby forgetting that science
begins by questioning the obvious (Bachelard 1938). Still, the dominant view
is the one which regards science as an activity of isolated geniuses.
Lack of attention to technology contributes to this individualistic and elitist
view. On the one hand, the complexity of scientiﬁc-technological work which
demands the integration of several kinds of knowledge, impossibly mastered
by a single person, is ignored; on the other hand, importance is not given to
the contribution of technicians who play a vital role in scientiﬁc-technolog-
ical development. The starting point of the Industrial Revolution, for
example, was the steam engine invented by Newcomen, a blacksmith and
smelter. As Bybee (2000) has pointed out: ‘In reviewing contemporary sci-
entiﬁc research, one cannot escape the reality that most advances in science
are based on technology’. This questions the elitist vision of scientiﬁc-intel-
lectual work being ranked above technical work.
The individualistic and elitist image of scientiﬁc activity is made evident in
iconographies which usually depict a man in white in an isolated laboratory,
completely surrounded by strange instruments. Thus, we come to a third
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distortion: the one which associates scientiﬁc work almost exclusively with
work done in a laboratory, where the scientist observes and experiments in
search of a happy ‘discovery’. Thereby, an empirical-inductive view of sci-
entiﬁc activity is conveyed, which the oblivion of technology contributes to.
5. An Empiricist-Inductivist, Non-theoretical View of Science
The idea of experimentation as ‘the principal route to scientiﬁc knowledge’
(McComas 1998) is, probably, the distortion which has been most studied
and which most frequently appears in literature (Ferna´ndez et al. 2002). It is
a conception which enhances ‘neutral’ observation and experimentation,
forgetting the important role played by theoretically founded hypothesis as a
guide to research.
Several studies have shown the discrepancy between the view of science
given by contemporary epistemology and certain teachers’ conceptions,
which lean heavily towards empiricism (Giordan 1978; Hodson 1985;
Nussbaum 1989; Cleminson 1990; King 1991; Stinner 1992; De´sautels et al.
1993; Lakin and Wellington 1994; Hewson, Kerby and Cook 1995; Thomaz
et al. 1996; McComas 1998). These erroneous empiricist-inductivist views of
science are frequently voiced by even scientists themselves, because they are
not always explicitly conscious of their research strategies (Mosterı´n 1990).
We should point out that the view of scientiﬁc knowledge as a result of
experimentation, overlaps with the notion of scientiﬁc ‘discovery’ presented
by mass-media and other forms of popular culture (Lakin and Wellington
1994).
Although this distorted view of scientiﬁc activity is the most studied and
criticised in literature, most science teachers continue to adhere to this con-
ception. To understand why, we have to take into account that, in spite of the
importance verbally given to observation and experimentation, science
teaching, in general, is mainly a simple transmission of knowledge, without
real experimental work (beyond some ‘kitchen recipes’). For this reason,
experimentation is still seen, both by teachers and students, as an ‘awaited
revolution’, as we have observed in interviews with teachers (Ferna´ndez
2000).
This absence of experimental work in science classes is in part caused by
teachers’ lack of acquaintance with technology. Eﬀectively, experimental work
always requires the support of technology: for instance, to test the hypotheses
which guide a research, we are obliged to conceive and construct experi-
mental designs; and to speak of designs is to speak of technological work. It is
true that, as Bunge (1976) points out, experimental designs are based on
theoretical knowledge: the conception and construction, for instance, of an
ammeter demands a sound knowledge of electrical current. But this con-
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struction also requires the solution of many practical problems in a complex
process which has all the characteristics of technological work. It is not just a
question of saying that some technological developments have been crucial to
make possible certain scientiﬁc advancement (like, for example, the role
played by lenses in astronomical research): technology is always at the centre
of scientiﬁc activity; the expression experimental design, we insist, is perfectly
illustrative of this.
Unfortunately, the laboratory practices in school science prevent students,
even in higher education from getting acquainted with the design and imple-
mentation of adequate experiments to test hypotheses, because they typically
use designs already elaborated following kitchen recipes. Thus, science teaching
focused on simple knowledge transmission impedes the understanding of the
role played by technology in scientiﬁc development and favours the perma-
nence of empirical-inductive conceptions which emphasise inaccessible exper-
imental work as a key element of the so-called ‘ScientiﬁcMethod’. This conveys
two other serious distortions which we shall discuss next.
6. Science as a Rigid, Algorithmic and Infallible Process
This is a very well known distortion which presents the ‘Scientiﬁc Method’ as
a sequence of steps to be mechanically followed, enhancing quantitative
treatments, rigorous control, etc, and forgetting – or even rejecting – any-
thing related to invention, creativity, or doubt.
This is a wide-spread view among science teachers, as we have conﬁrmed
using diﬀerent designs (Ferna´ndez 2000). For example, in interviews held
with teachers, a majority have referred to the ‘Scientiﬁc Method’ as a se-
quence of well deﬁned steps in which observations and rigorous experiments
play a central role which contributes to the exactness and objectivity of the
results obtained. Such a view is particularly evident in the evaluation of
science education: as Hodson (1992) points out, the obsessive preoccupation
with avoiding ambiguity and assuring the reliability of the evaluation process
distorts the nature of the scientiﬁc approach itself, essentially vague, uncer-
tain, intuitive. This is particularly true when we refer to experimental work,
where technology plays an essential role and, as we have already remem-
bered, many unexpected problems appear which must be solved in order to
obtain the correct functioning of the experimental designs. Evaluation should
take into account this ambiguity instead of trying to eradicate it.
Some teachers, in rejecting this rigid and dogmatic view of science, may
accept an extreme relativism, both methodological – ‘anything goes’, there
are no speciﬁc strategies in scientiﬁc work (Feyerabend 1975) – and con-
ceptual: there is no objective reality which allows us to test the validity
of scientiﬁc construction. ‘The only basis for scientiﬁc knowledge is the
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consensus of the research community’. This is a relativism close to the theses
of radical constructivism (Glasersfeld 1989) which has received serious crit-
icism (Suchting 1992; Matthews 2000; Gil-Perez et al. 2002).
Nevertheless, the dominant conception is the simplistic algorithmic one,
which, like the related empirical-inductive conception, is easily accepted in as
much as scientiﬁc knowledge is presented in a ﬁnished form just to be acc-
epted and learnt: eﬀectively, in this way, neither students nor teachers have
the possibility of putting into practice and realising the limitations of the so-
called Scientiﬁc Method. For the same reason one falls easily into an aproble-
matic and ahistorical view of scientiﬁc activity which we shall comment on in
the next section.
7. An Ahistorical and, therefore, Closed and Dogmatic View of Science
A teaching orientation based on the simple transmission of knowledge often
results in ignoring the initial problems scientists intended to solve, neglecting
the evolution of such knowledge, the diﬃculties encountered, the limitations
of current scientiﬁc theories or new perspectives. In doing this, one forgets
that, as Bachelard (1938) stated ‘all knowledge is the answer to a question’.
The omission of the problem and of the process to construct an answer
makes it diﬃcult to perceive the rationality, relevance and interest of the
knowledge constructed and its tentative character.
Let us emphasise the close relationship between the distortions we have
considered thus far. For example, this dogmatic and ahistorical view rein-
forces simplistic ideas regarding science-technology relationships which
present technology as a by-product of science. We should bear in mind that
research is an answer to problems that are often linked to human needs and
so to the search for adequate solutions to previous technological problems.
As a matter of fact, the absence of a technological dimension in science
education impregnates the na€ve and distorted views of science we are elic-
iting. This lack of attention to technology is historically rooted in the unequal
appreciation of intellectual and manual work, and deeply aﬀects the neces-
sary scientiﬁc and technological literacy of all citizens.
But the distorted, impoverished view of science we are discussing here
includes two other misconceptions which both fail to consider that one of the
aims of science is the construction of coherent bodies of knowledge. We are
referring to an ‘exclusively analytic’ view and to a ‘linear, cumulative’ view of
scientiﬁc processes. Although they are not so directly related to the oblivion
of technology, we shall brieﬂy refer to them, because this ensemble of dis-
tortions form a relatively well integrated framework and they support each
other. We need, for this reason, to analyse all of them, in order to question
the ensemble and make possible a more adequate vision of scientiﬁc activity.
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8. An Exclusively Analytical Approach
Why do we speak of an exclusively analytical view as a distortion? It is
obvious that analyses and simpliﬁcations are initially necessary, but we
should not forget the subsequent eﬀorts to synthesise and construct
increasingly larger bodies of scientiﬁc knowledge, or the treatment of prob-
lems which overlap diﬀerent disciplines and can be integrated. It is the
omission of these syntheses and integration processes which constitutes a
distortion. This is the reason we speak of an exclusively analytical view.
Current science education is strongly aﬀected by this omission of the
integration process. We have veriﬁed (Ferna´ndez 2000) that most of the
teachers and textbooks do not enhance, for example, the integration achieved
by the Newtonian synthesis of heaven and earth mechanics; an integration
which had been rejected for more than a century with the damnation of
Copernicus’ and Galileo’s work and the inclusion of their books in the ‘Index
Librorum Prohibitorum’. The same happens with the presentation of bio-
logical evolution (still ignored by many teachers and opposed by some social
groups) or organic synthesis (considered impossible, for ideological reasons,
until the end of the XIX century).
9. A Linear, Cumulative View
The last relevant misconception we have detected consists of the consider-
ation of the evolution of scientiﬁc knowledge as the result of a linear,
cumulative progression (McComas 1998; Izquierdo et al. 1999). This ignores
periods of crisis and profound change (Kuhn 1970) and the fact that the
development of scientiﬁc knowledge does not ﬁt into any well-deﬁned pre-
dictable pattern of evolution (Giere 1988; Estany 1990).
This misconception complements, in a certain sense, the rigid and algo-
rithmic view we have already discussed, although they must be diﬀerentiated:
while the later refers to how a particular research is organised and carried
out, the cumulative view is a simplistic interpretation of the evolution of
scientiﬁc bodies of knowledge, which is seen as a linear process. Science
teaching reinforces this distortion by presenting theories in their current
state, omitting the process of their construction, which includes occasional
periods of confrontation between contrary theories or outbreaks of authentic
‘scientiﬁc revolutions’ (Kuhn 1970).
10. To Overcome a Distorted and Impoverished Image of Science: Some
Implications for Science Teaching
These are the seven major distortions we have detected in current sci-
ence teaching by means of, among other procedures, analysis of textbooks,
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laboratory guides and assessment exercises; direct observation of classroom
activities; questionnaires; interviews … (Ferna´ndez 2000). This study has
shown that the na€ve image of science expressed by the seven distortions we
have mentioned is deeply rooted in current science teaching, centred almost
exclusively in the transmission of conceptual knowledge. This occurs even at
the university level, the result being that future teachers implicitly embrace
this naı¨ve image of science and related ineﬀective teaching strategies based on
the simple transmission of conceptual knowledge.
We have to emphasize that the seven major distortions we have elicited do
not constitute seven autonomous ‘deadly sins’. On the contrary, as we have
already shown, they form a relatively well-integrated conceptual framework
and they support each other, transmitting an impoverished view of science,
and technology, which generates negative attitudes in many students and
makes meaningful learning more diﬃcult. This is the reason why Guilbert
and Meloche (1993) have stated, ‘A better understanding by science teachers
in training of how science knowledge is constructed is not just a theoretical
debate but a highly practical one’. In fact, the clariﬁcation of the possible
distortions of the nature of science and technology makes possible the
movement away from the typical reductionism of the activities included in
science teaching and the incorporation of aspects which give a more adequate
view of science as an open and creative activity. An activity centred in a
contextualized approach (Klassen 2003) of problematic situations (Gil-Pe´rez
et al. 2002) – or, in other words, Large context problems (Stinner 1995) –
relevant to the construction of knowledge and/or the attainment of techno-
logical innovations, capable of satisfying human needs.
This strategy aims basically to involve pupils, with the aid and orientation
of the teacher, in an open and creative work, inspired in that of scientists and
technicians, thus including essential aspects currently ignored in science
education, such as the following (Gil et al. 2002):
The discussion of the possible interest and worthiness of studying the situ-
ations proposed, taking into account the STSE implications, in order to make
this study meaningful and prevent students from becoming immersed in the
treatment of a situation without having had the opportunity to form a ﬁrst
motivating idea about it. In this way pupils, as members of the scientiﬁc
community, will have the occasion to practice decision making about
undertaking (or not) a certain research or innovation (Aikenhead 1985).
The qualitative study of the situations, taking decisions with the help of the
necessary bibliographic researches to deﬁne and delimit concrete problems. If
we want pupils to really understand what they are doing, it is essential to begin
with qualitative and meaningful approaches… as scientists themselves do.
The invention of concepts and forming of hypotheses as tentative answers,
founded in pupils’ previous knowledge and personal conceptions, which will
help to focus the problems to be studied and orientate their treatment.
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The elaboration and implementation of possible strategies for solving the
problems, including, where appropriate, experimental designs to check
hypotheses. It is necessary to highlight the interest of these designs and the
implementation of experiments which demand (and aid to develop) a multi-
plicity of knowledge and skills, including technological work to solve the
practical diﬃculties usually posed by designs.
The analysis and communication of the results, comparing them with those
obtained by other pupils’ teams and the scientiﬁc community. This can
produce cognitive conﬂicts between diﬀerent conceptions and demand auto
and inter regulation, this is to say, the formation of new hypotheses and the
reorientation of the research. At the same time this can be the occasion to
approach the evolution, sometimes dramatic, experimented by the knowledge
accepted by the scientiﬁc community. It is particularly important to enhance
communication as an essential aspect of the collective dimension of scientiﬁc
and technological work. This means that students must get acquainted with
reading and writing scientiﬁc reports as well as with oral discussions.
The recapitulation of the work done, connecting the new constructions with
the body of knowledge already possessed and paying attention to establishing
bridges between diﬀerent scientiﬁc domains, which occasionally may generate
authentic scientiﬁc revolutions.
The contemplation of possible perspectives, such as the conception of new
problems, the realisation and improvement of technological products, which
can contribute to the reinforcement of pupils’ interest.
All this allows the application of the new knowledge in a variety of situ-
ations to deepen and consolidate, putting special emphasis on the STSE
relationships which frame scientiﬁc development and, even more, human
development, without forgetting the serious situation of planetary emergency
(Gil-Pe´rez et al. 2003), as international institutions demand of educators of
any area (United Nations 1992).
We would like to highlight that the orientations above do not constitute an
algorithm that tries to guide the pupils’ activity step by step, but rather they
must be taken as general indications which draw attention to essential aspects
concerning the construction of scientiﬁc knowledge not suﬃciently taken into
account in science education. We are referring both to procedural and to
axiological aspects such as STSE relationships (Solbes & Vilches 1997),
decision-making (Aikenhead 1985), communication (Sutton 1998), etc., in
order to create a climate of collective research undertaken by students’ teams,
acting as novice researchers, with the teacher’s assistance. In this way, pupils
participate in the (re)construction of knowledge and learn more meaningfully
(Hodson 1993; Gil et al. 2002).
The including by science teachers of activities such as those mentioned
above, is an example of the positive incidence that the clariﬁcation of the
nature of science may have. We don’t think, naturally, that this is enough to
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correctly guide the science teaching/learning process, but we do think that
this is a valuable contribution, a sine qua non requisite.
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